Friday, October 7, 2011

Nationalism: Kedourie, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Anderson


"It has become common for Western scholars to look upon the nation-state as a thoroughly modern creation, an artifact of a global political and economic order that has existed for perhaps four centuries. It’s also common for scholars to see nationalism, a political and cultural ideology, as a prerequisite for the nation-state’s existence. A “nation” exists and matters, in this view, only because people already believe it exists and matters. This makes sense to me. But typical explanations of nationalism neglect its very personal character. Treating nationalism as a political ideology, they fail to explore it as a middle-class affective experience. They try to explain how the French became French, but neglect to ask whether this explains why a Frenchman became a Frenchman. They explain why a flag flies over city hall, but not why it flies over someone’s front yard. At times, they even depict national identity as something that swallows up personal identity.
Among American historians, who are strongly influenced by Western European scholarship, the most common models for the origins of nationalism fall into two broad categories. Both are collective, large-scale accounts. On the one hand, scholars like Elie Kedourie and Eric Hobsbawm have treated nationalism as an idea invented, more or less deliberately, by European intellectuals—almost as a sort of trick played on the masses. According to Elie Kedourie, the concept of the nation itself, in the term’s modern sense, entered common usage only after the French Revolution, and nationalism took form as philosophers devised a theory of freedom that denigrated the individual and unleashed one of history’s most destructive forces.  According to Eric Hobsbawm, similarly, modern nations owe their potency to “invented traditions” that give them a fictional aura of ancient legitimacy. Hobsbawm depicts these traditions as artifacts of nineteenth-century bourgeois society, which produced university-trained intellectuals as the spokesmen of the new ruling (middle) classes.  In these accounts, the decorations I saw on that house in Massachusetts are side effects of clever statecraft.
The alternative view, taken up by scholars like Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, represents the nation as something that emerged naturally from the conditions of modern life. In Ernest Gellner’s interpretation, the nation-state is simply the political unit that makes sense to humans living in an “industrial” society. Whereas agrarian peoples may be content to leave literacy and culture to a specialized class, highly mobile industrial societies must foster widespread literacy and cultural homogeneity. This requires the resources of a nation-sized state, complete with a comprehensive education system. Economic modernization, says Gellner, thus teaches people to look to the nation-state for justice and progress.  Meanwhile, Benedict Anderson’s no less ambitious “imagined communities” thesis holds that the nation-state rose together with a totally new sense of humanity’s place in the cosmos. Instead of seeing themselves as subjects under the throne of God, enjoying commonality in a sacred universal order, modern Europeans (and their imperial subjects) came to view themselves as haphazardly coinciding in space and time. Thanks to international trade and the substitution of vernacular official languages for Latin, their conceptual space was defined by the newspaper, the almanac, or the novel, which represented jumbles of events in endless, numbing succession. What the moderns needed was a new basis for solidarity, a new explanation for their being thrown together on a chaotic, one-way journey through time. They found this, Anderson says, in the nation, which was essentially a community of print circulation.
Gellner and especially Anderson thus come closer to capturing what I think is essential; they give us the nation as a way to order human experience in an age of atomization. As local affinities on the one hand and universal order on the other gave way to the fluid marketplace, the nation became a vessel that looked big enough to carry modern humans safely into the future. In this interpretation, the flags flying in that Massachusetts town are simply evidence that the churches and shops have lost their power to define the community. Yet even these accounts, as sensitive as they are to the needs of the person, cling to the idea that nationalism is to be understood ultimately as a political ideology. All of these accounts begin and end as attempts to explain why political revolutions happen."

The Philippines' Chinese Mestizos

 The Chinese Mestizos and the Formation of the Filipino Identity.









José Rizal, the Philippine National Hero, was a mestizo de sangley.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

'Stay hungry. Stay foolish.'

http://www.youtube.com/user/StanfordUniversity#p/search/0/UF8uR6Z6KLc


Your time is limited, so don’t waste it living someone else’s life. Don’t be
trapped by dogma — which is living with the results of other people’s
thinking. Don’t let the noise of others’ opinions drown out your own inner
voice. And most importantly, have the courage to follow your heart and
intuition. They somehow already know what you truly want to become.
Everything else is secondary. 




     --  Steve Jobs, 24 Feb 1955 - 5 Oct 2011














Friday, September 30, 2011

To 'find our mortal world enough'



Lullaby



Lay your sleeping head, my love,
Human on my faithless arm;
Time and fevers burn away
Individual beauty from
Thoughtful children, and the grave
Proves the child ephemeral:
But in my arms till break of day
Let the living creature lie,
Mortal, guilty, but to me
The entirely beautiful.



Soul and body have no bounds:
To lovers as they lie upon
Her tolerant enchanted slope
In their ordinary swoon,
Grave the vision Venus sends
Of supernatural sympathy,
Universal love and hope;
While an abstract insight wakes
Among the glaciers and the rocks
The hermit's carnal ecstasy.



Certainty, fidelity
On the stroke of midnight pass
Like vibrations of a bell
And fashionable madmen raise
Their pedantic boring cry:
Every farthing of the cost,
All the dreaded cards foretell,
Shall be paid, but from this night
Not a whisper, not a thought,
Not a kiss nor look be lost.



Beauty, midnight, vision dies:
Let the winds of dawn that blow
Softly round your dreaming head
Such a day of welcome show
Eye and knocking heart may bless,
Find our mortal world enough;
Noons of dryness find you fed
By the involuntary powers,
Nights of insult let you pass
Watched by every human love.



          -  WH Auden, January 1937








Sunday, September 25, 2011

Eulogy/ Obituary - Gone to Glory: John Merrington by Peter Linebaugh



Summer 1997
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3780/is_199707/ai_n8760777/?tag=content;col1



William Morris:   Let us grieve then - and help every soul in our sorrow  /  Let us fear - and press forward where few dare to go /  Let us falter in hope - and plan deeds for the morrow  /  The world crowned with freedom, the fall of the foe.



Peter Berger on 'Islamophobia' - what's real, what's not


"If one takes apart the term “Islamophobia,” with its suggestion of some sort of psychiatric aberration, it is useful to ask where the word “phobia” actually applies, and where it does not.
There is indeed a fear of Islam which is irrational and which can plausibly be compared with other dystopias of Western civilization being inundated by alien hordes. One can go back here at least to the 1920s, when there was widespread fear of the “yellow peril,” more recently replicated in fear of a takeover by Japanese and now Chinese economic power. More directly related to the fear of demographic conquest is a novel published in French in 1973 by Jean Raspail, The Camp of the Saints (thus titled in the English translation). Muslims play no important role in this fantasy. A crazed Hindu preacher calls on all the poor in Calcutta to get on a ship and sail to Europe in order to live the good life there. A mighty movement emerges and a huge flotilla of ships, carrying hundreds of thousands of pilgrim “saints” moves toward Europe. Half-hearted attempts by naval warships to stop the flotilla are given up, so as not to create a massacre. Europe waits helplessly as the flotilla approaches. The radio stops all programs and only broadcasts classical European music—the dying song of a doomed civilization.
The fantasies of “Germanorabia” or “Eurabia,” not to mention “Londonostan,” stand in this tradition. The demographic realities do not support these prognoses. As to the economic realities, a takeover by Chinese corporations, not likely in any case, is even less likely than a takeover by Arabian oil tycoons. And of course these phobias presuppose a stereotype of “the Muslim” as inexorably filled with animosity toward Western values. Except for the admittedly important areas of gender and family, there is again no empirical basis for the stereotype. Survey data from Europe show that most Muslim immigrants are law-abiding and want to become part of the host societies. Troubling numbers of Muslims in Europe voice sympathy for terrorists, but much of this can be attributed to a rhetorical expression of social frustrations and is very rarely translated into actual support. The community of terrorists and their active supporters in Europe is very small—certainly a cause for concern by the authorities, but not a justification for a generalization about Muslims.
Nevertheless, not all the fears subsumed under the term “Islamophobia” are irrational. As far as Islam in general is concerned, there are indeed some aspects of the religion that make for tension with Western values. It is not so much a propensity to legitimate violence—this propensity, I think, exists in all religious traditions, certainly in Judaism and Christianity. But as an Egyptian journalist recently put it (courageously, one may say)—not all Muslims are terrorists, but most terrorists are Muslims. Terrorism inspired by a particular interpretation of Islam is real. One should take its Islamic self-identification seriously, and not claim that it is “really” about something other than religion. The reiterated statements by Western political and religious leaders that there is no war against Islam are correct and desirable. But there is also an understandable tendency to underplay the Islamic contents of terroristic ideology. It was very laudable that President Bush, immediately after September 11, announced that “Islam means peace”. I assume that Bush’s credentials as an Islam scholar are modest, so somebody must have told him that the name of the religion comes from the Arabic word for peace,salaam. There may be an etymological connection, but the name actually means “submission”—‘aslama. 
Some Muslim scholars have proposed that the term jihad, usually translated as “holy war,” refers to the struggle for faith in the lives of believers. Perhaps so. But throughout much of the history of Islam the term has meant violence against the infidel, and much of what we now know as the Muslim world is the result of conquest by force of arms.  Yet the main difficulty with Western values for Muslims is the very close relationship between religion and the state in Islam, ever since Muhammad became a political and military leader in Medina. Survey data show that majorities of Muslims everywhere support democracy. But this does not necessarily include the separation of religion and the state. I understand that in Arabic there is no separate word for “religion”. The common word is din—the same as the word for law.
It is also the case that a sizable number of especially young Muslims in Europe do not want to become part of the host societies, and they are often encouraged in this by what is preached in mosques and on the internet. Such ideas are very plausible in lower-class communities, as in the banlieus that surrounds big cities in France. But the call for non-integration is also embraced by some intellectuals who live in comfortable circumstances. Thus there is the real prospect of a religiously defined subculture, living in tension with Western democratic values. The threat of violence associated in public opinion with this prospect makes for a readiness to give in to the slightest expression of Muslim victimization. Also, one must not overlook the substantial increase of anti-Semitism in Europe, much of it fueled by Muslim hostility to Israel. Anti-Zionism here merges with a long European tradition of hostility against Jews. The tradition seemed suppressed in the recent past, but the taboo against anti-Semitism, caused by revulsion against the horror of the Holocaust, seems to be fading. Barring the unlikely establishment of real peace between Israel and the Palestinians, the growing participation of Muslims in European politics can only enhance this alarming development. In sum, there are cultural and political anxieties caused by the increasingly visible presence of Islam—the call from the minaret overwhelming the familiar sound of church bells—which cannot be simply put down as phobias and expressions of racism.
I have no neat package of policies to recommend, certainly not in the area of national security and counter-terrorism. There is an increasingly robust debate within the Muslim world on the relationship between Islam and modernity, and outsiders are likely to be counter-productive if they try to meddle in this. Outsiders cannot tell Muslims what their faith is supposed to mean. All the same, it is certainly useful if Western leaders continue to emphasize that they are not engaged in a “war against Islam.”
The overall issue of immigration into Europe will require policy changes that are simultaneously more and less liberal. More liberal: Europe urgently needs more immigrants, and its borders should be as open as possible, with preference given to immigrants that can contribute to the economy. Less liberal: Access to the benefits of the welfare state should be more limited (if only because the generous European welfare state is no longer affordable). As to the cultural issues, every effort must be made, especially in the educational system, to overcome the segregation of Muslim immigrants in an adversary subculture (no matter whether the segregation is imposed from the outside or sought from within). 
I have suggested a sort of “triage” approach to these issues. There are some practices that cannot possibly be tolerated—such as honor killing, genital mutilation, child marriage. Others are clearly not only acceptable but mandated in a democratic society—such as the right to worship freely, including the right to erect houses of worship. In between there is a gray area suitable for negotiation and compromise. Fostering the emergence of a genuinely European Islam will also have policy implications (for example, in the expenditure of public funds), although this emergence must be led and realized from within the Muslim community. I know that I am rather vague on questions of policy. Here as elsewhere, the devil is in the details. This is not the place to go into such details.
The presence of Islam has pushed forward reflection about “European values”, which all newcomers should be required to accept. One can propose various lists, but I have argued that all these values (easily embraced by Americans) can be summed up in one sentence of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany: “The dignity of man is inviolate” (“Die Wuerde des Menschen ist unantastbar”). This dignity pertains to every humanindividual, apart from his or her collective identities. I believe that this is a non-negotiable core principle of Western civilization and its democratic institutions. Muslim civilization has admirable instances of instituting the rights of communities, as in theconvivienca between the Abrahamic faiths in Muslim Spain or in the millet system of the Ottoman empire. Individuals of course benefited by participation in their communities. Muslim criminal and personal law protects a number of individual rights, such as the right to a fair trial or to a fair share of an inheritance. But, as far as I know, Muslim civilization has not recognized the right of individuals against their community. This, I think, should be an important topic for intercultural and interfaith dialogue."

Saturday, September 10, 2011

History from 'below'



A Worker Reads History

Who built the seven gates of Thebes?
The books are filled with names of kings.
Was it the kings who hauled the craggy blocks of stone?
And Babylon, so many times destroyed.
Who built the city up each time? In which of Lima's houses,
That city glittering with gold, lived those who built it?
In the evening when the Chinese wall was finished
Where did the masons go? Imperial Rome
Is full of arcs of triumph. Who reared them up? Over whom
Did the Caesars triumph? Byzantium lives in song.
Were all her dwellings palaces? And even in Atlantis of the legend
The night the seas rushed in,
The drowning men still bellowed for their slaves.

Young Alexander conquered India.
He alone?
Caesar beat the Gauls.
Was there not even a cook in his army?
Phillip of Spain wept as his fleet
was sunk and destroyed. Were there no other tears?
Frederick the Great triumphed in the Seven Years War.
Who triumphed with him?

Each page a victory
At whose expense the victory ball?
Every ten years a great man,
Who paid the piper?

So many particulars.
So many questions.

                       
                               - Bertolt Brecht