Monday, January 20, 2014



‘No Bullshit’ Bullshit

Stefan Collini

  • Orwell's Victory by Christopher Hitchens
    Allen Lane, 150 pp, £9.99, June 2002, ISBN 0 7139 9584 X
Winning is very important to Christopher Hitchens. Dr Johnson was said to ‘talk for victory’, and by all accounts it seems the same might be said of Hitchens. He certainly writes for victory. His preferred genre is the polemic; his favoured tone mixes forensic argument with high-octane contempt. And no one can accuse him of only picking on boys his own size: he is happy to take the ring against tubby, bespectacled former diplomats and little, shrivelled old ladies as well as (special contempt here) relatively fit joggers. His indictments of Henry Kissinger, Mother Teresa and Bill Clinton have been among the glories of the prosecuting counsel’s art in recent years. Taking the global village as his courtroom, Hitchens asks us, the jury, to stare with wonder and loathing at these singular specimens of human depravity who are united in being parsimonious with the truth and in being the object of some very good jokes.
From his early Trotskyist days on the New Statesman, through extended spells as a columnist for Vanity Fair and the Nation, and spreading out into contributions to a daunting variety of other weeklies and monthlies, Hitchens has been a prolific journalist, and in addition to his books he has now published four collections of his articles and essays. This is where much of his best writing is found and where he displays the range of his literary tastes as well as the incisiveness of his literary judgments. Hitchens is one of the best contemporary examples of a species we tend to think of as flourishing in the 19th century rather than the 21st, the political journalist as man of letters. He would have been entirely at home with the slash-and-burn style of the early partisan quarterlies, such as the Edinburgh or the Westminster, disposing of shoddy Romantic poetry and shoddy arguments in favour of the slave trade or the unreformed House of Commons with equal gusto, in a style two parts Hazlitt to one part Cobbett with a dash of Croker’s Tory venom.
It’s worth considering what kind of cultural authority this type of writing can lay claim to these days. It self-consciously repudiates the credentials of academic scholarship; it disparages the narrow technical expertise of the policy wonk; it cannot rest on the standing of achievement as a politician or novelist. In other words, it has nothing to declare but its talent. Knowing the facts is very important; knowing the people helps (there’s a fair bit of anecdotage and I-was-there-ism in Hitchens’s journalism). But in the end it stands or falls by the cogency of its case, based on vigorous moral intuitions, honesty and integrity in expressing them, mastery of the relevant sources and a forceful, readable style. Car licence-plates in New Hampshire bear (rather threateningly, it always seems to me, as big SUVs speed by) the state motto ‘Live free or die.’ In this spirit, the maxim on Hitchens’s crest has to be ‘Get it right or die.’
In the early part of his writing career, Hitchens’s main way of being always right was to be very Left, but he has recently been casting off this identity, at least in its familiar forms. Now it appears that the infallible litmus test of whether one is on the right track is whether most people think the contrary. Comrade Hitchens may still be susceptible to the pull of fraternity when embodied by old buddies from the New Left Review, but his self-ascribed identity now is as a ‘contrarian’. Being ‘independent’ (of parties, institutions, conventional wisdom, codes of politeness) is the thing. He describes himself in a recent essay as writing in opposition to ‘the present complacently “liberal” consensus’, when it’s pretty clear that what really gets his goat is that it is a consensus and that it’s complacent rather than just that it’s liberal. In the same piece he introduces a sentence with the nicely self-ironic phrase ‘without wishing to seem even-handed’, but it’s hard to think of anyone for whom this is less of a risk. Irreverence is more highly prized than ever (he’s always admired Wilde), and he hates cant, especially pious cant, especially pious radical academic cant. This protects him from any risk of being well thought of by the well-meaning, particularly in the US, and he further insures himself against the danger of being approved of by his conspicuous consumption of fags and booze.
Of course, in choosing to distance oneself from a particular ‘consensus’, especially a liberal consensus, one inevitably appears to be aligning oneself with its other, more usual opponents. Hitchens’s recent high-profile resignation from the Nation illustrates the difficulty. His denunciation of his erstwhile colleagues’ too predictable criticisms of US foreign policy and their too indulgent perspective on the response of some of those who suffer the impact of that policy in other parts of the world can make him look like a recruit to the ranks of those who would have us all line up against the ‘axis of evil’. In such circumstances, too irritable an aversion from one’s self-righteously ‘radical’ associates can lead one into some very unlovely company, and the self-contradictoriness of consistent contrarianism can produce odd outcomes. Surely Hitchens is not going to go the way of Paul Johnson, one of the leading attack-journalists (and New Statesmanstalwarts) of a previous generation, now reduced to indiscriminate barking at all things ‘fashionable’, while intoning pas d’ennemis à droite?
As it happens, I’ve been rereading Hitchens’s latest collection of essays,Unacknowledged Legislation (2001), alongside a couple of other collections that have recently appeared in paperback, Martin Amis’s The War against Cliché and Frank Kermode’s Pleasing Myself. That’s a tough poker table to ask anyone to sit at, and it’s impressive that some of Hitchens’s best pieces, or at least some of his best paragraphs, don’t seem out of place. It’s true that he is quite often doing something different from those two contrasting masters of the literary review-essay, something more argumentative and political, but even when allowance is made for that, this company does in the end make his writing seem a bit blowsy or over-pleased with itself, certainly too prone to go for the cheap shot. Amis is partial to a spot of sitting duck, too, but he pays in full for his day’s shooting from his wad of newly minted images, while Kermode mostly contents himself with a saddened shake of the head, a devastating weapon in its way, but one that doesn’t leave any mess on the carpet. Hitchens loves mess on the carpet.
What Hitchens hasn’t previously attempted at any length is the positive tribute, the admiring portrait. It has long been clear, however, that George Orwell is something of a hero of his, as of most political journalists with claims to be both essayists and tellers of unpopular truths, and now, spurred by the appearance four years ago of Peter Davison’s marvellously thorough complete edition of Orwell’s writings (and no doubt with an eye on Orwell’s centenary, which falls this year), he has written a short book entirely devoted to telling us, as the title of the US edition has it, ‘Why Orwell Matters’. One therefore turns with interest to see how Hitchens, an acknowledged master of the literary bazooka attack, will acquit himself in the trickier arts of discriminating appreciation.
Orwell’s Victory has both a dedication and an epigraph, not unusual things in themselves, but in this case curious and curiously revealing. The dedication is to Robert Conquest, ‘premature anti-fascist, premature anti-Stalinist, poet and mentor, and founder of “the united front against bullshit”’. It seems that Conquest is being saluted here principally for having been against a lot of things; this appears to be an early signal of the connection between being ‘anti’ and telling it like it is. Hitchens is all for being against things (and one thinks again of the title of that collection by his friend Martin Amis), though here he perhaps risks the mild paradox of ‘we contrarians must stick together.’ The dedication also seems to suggest that Conquest is being praised for being against certain things before most people were, though the tonal unsteadiness of ‘premature’, whatever its ironic intent, risks putting Conquest in the company of babies, conclusions, ejaculations. Conquest, it seems, is to be understood in Nietzsche’s sense, as an ‘untimely man’ (contrarians are prone to congratulate themselves on being out of step with their times), or perhaps, to take up Larkin’s more familiar idiom, one of ‘the less deceived’. Even though we haven’t even got to the contents page, we’re starting to catch a whiff of the ‘no bullshit’ bullshit that is one of Hitchens’s trademarks.
The epigraph is from Proust and, being from Proust, is a paragraph long. It is about one kind of genius, genius as ‘reflecting power’, the kind of genius possessed by those who, though they may not always be those ‘whose conversation is the most brilliant’ or ‘culture the most extensive’, can ‘transform their personality into a sort of mirror’. The reader is naturally led to hear this as the first touch on the tuning-fork, striking the right note for the ensuing performance about Orwell. Actually, as one reads and rereads this passage, its meaning starts to slip through one’s grasp. The ‘men who produce works of genius’ are those who have the power to ‘transform their personality into a sort of mirror, in such a way that their life, however mediocre it may be socially and even, in a sense, intellectually, is reflected by it, genius consisting in reflecting power and not in the intrinsic quality of the scene reflected’. Taken alone, this might serve as a manifesto both for the purest naturalism (the best mirrors are those which reflect most faithfully and in most detail) and for extreme aestheticism (the subject written about is irrelevant, imaginative intensity is all). But what it doesn’t seem to be, on fuller reflection (so to speak), is a very apt way to characterise Orwell’s strengths, or indeed those of anyone who, like Orwell and like Hitchens himself, writes about what is going on in the public world and about what actually, despite appearances, makes things happen. Although the passage appears at first reading to suggest something about Orwell’s self-absenting directness of observation and his much-praised (and self-praised) ‘power of facing unpleasant facts’, it comes to seem quite the opposite, a celebration of an almost Jamesian capacity for infusing a charged intensity of consciousness into the detail of experience. The passage may also prompt an association with Orwell’s endlessly quoted dictum that ‘good prose is like a windowpane.’ This is a formula whose shortcomings don’t need to be dwelled on, but at least it suggests that one looks through the window, at the world outside, whereas the defining quality of the mirror is to bounce vision back at the viewer. As with ‘premature’ in the dedication, one is left a little uncertain what signal the epigraph is intended to send.
The acknowledgments then begin, with thanks to ‘my old English master’, who set Hitchens to read Animal Farm ‘and who allowed me to show him my work, late, as an off-the-subject comparison with Darkness at Noon: the first decent essay I ever wrote’. It is often said that Englishmen tend to be fixated on their schooldays, especially when they went to the kind of minor public school that Hitchens went to, and there is certainly an unexpectedly nostalgic tea and crumpets flavour to this, as well as a statue-in-the-marble recognition of early signs of later identity (despite the missed deadline), a kind of coming home. It hints at a more personal answer to the question of ‘why Orwell matters’.
And then, as the opening to the introduction, we get a poem (there are a lot of antipasti to this relatively slight meal). The poem is by Conquest himself and is entitled simply ‘George Orwell’. It praises Orwell as ‘a moral genius’: ‘honesty’, ‘truth’ and ‘truth-seeking’ structure the citation, and Orwell is praised for testing words against ‘The real person, real event or thing’. Throughout, he is thumpingly commended for directing our attention to ‘reality’, as in the rather Empsonian line ‘Because he taught us what the actual meant’. Orwell figures here as an early (perhaps ‘premature’) member of ‘the united front against bullshit’; or, in other words, as one of Hitchens’s predecessors in the ‘no bullshit’ bullshit.
When we finally get going with Hitchens himself writing about Orwell, the effect is a little anti-climactic. This is partly because one had a pretty good sense in advance of the kind of thing Hitchens would want to say about him. ‘The three great subjects of the 20th century were imperialism, Fascism and Stalinism’; Orwell ‘was essentially “right”’ about these issues; and ‘he was enabled to be “right” by a certain insistence on intellectual integrity and independence.’ So far, so familiar. (It is interesting to note that Hitchens, loyal to aspects of the Trotskyism he has for the most part abandoned, always says Stalinism where most people would say Communism.) This is very much a political journalist’s view of the ‘great subjects’; from other perspectives one could make a case for, say, the mechanisation of agriculture, the development of global communications and changed attitudes towards sex – or, indeed, a whole variety of quite different ‘subjects’, though it’s harder to see what being ‘right’ would mean in such cases.
It is also a rather romantic view of the ‘independent’ intellectual. Orwell, Hitchens announces, ‘faced the competing orthodoxies and despotisms of his day with little more than a battered typewriter and a stubborn personality’. Most versions of ‘writers v. Leviathan’, to borrow Orwell’s own terms, are inclined to hit this over-dramatic, David and Goliath note, including the mandatory weapons-upgrade from slingshot to ‘battered typewriter’ (it wouldn’t do for the typewriter to be newish and in quite good nick). Orwell does seem to have been a brave man when put to the test, but to speak of him ‘facing’ despotisms from behind his desk ratchets up the register in a rather empty way. The lone protestor in Tiananmen Square, in the unforgettable image, certainly ‘faced’ the tank in a dramatically uneven contest, but those who write about orthodoxies and despotisms, especially from the distance of another country, don’t seem to merit the same verb. Similarly, most writers who address such topics do so with ‘little more’ than their typewriters and their personalities, battered, stubborn or otherwise. Of course, Hitchens needs to play up Orwell’s complete ‘independence’, partly because he shares with him the animating illusion that to be out of step with a large body of opinion is in itself the most likely indicator of being right.
It is not easy to write a good book about Orwell now. He has been written about so extensively, and sometimes well, that to justify devoting a whole book to him one would really need to have discovered some new material or be able to set him in some new context (not that this will deter publishers eager to cash in on his centenary). The main problem with Orwell’s Victory is that Hitchens doesn’t have enough to say about Orwell to fill a book, so he writes, in effect, as Orwell’s minder, briskly seeing off various characers who have in some way or other got him wrong. This is the structuring principle for a series of chapters on ‘Orwell and Empire’, ‘Orwell and the Left’, ‘Orwell and the Right’ and so on. Some of the offenders clearly deserve what they get, but there’s something repetitive and relentless about it, as though the duffing-up were more important than dealing with Orwell’s own writing. Raymond Williams is taken behind the bike sheds for a particularly nasty going-over; repetition of another kind adds to the problem here, since the substance of this long section was first delivered at the Hay-on-Wye literary festival in 1999 (as the Raymond Williams Memorial Lecture, if you please), then published in Critical Quarterly later that year, then republished inUnacknowledged Legislation. It’s a fair specimen of the Hitchens polemical manner – inveighing against ‘the overrated doyen of cultural studies and Cambridge English’ and his ‘almost deliberate obtuseness’, accusing his writing of being ‘replete with dishonesty and evasion’, and so on – but reading it again is a vaguely dispiriting experience, rather like watching an old video of a one-sided boxing match.
As always with Hitchens’s work, one gets the strongest possible sense of how much it matters to prove that one is and always has been right: right about which side to be on, right that there are sides and one has to be on one of them; right about which way the world (in the rather narrow, political journalist’s sense of that term) is going, right about which policies will work and which regimes are wicked; right about the accuracy of one’s facts and one’s stories; and right when so many others, especially well-regarded or well-placed others, are demonstrably wrong. There is a palpably macho tone to all of this, as of alpha males competing for dominance and display.
That one’s facts should be right seems desirable from most points of view, but since Hitchens makes so much of others’ failings here, one is driven to a spot of murmuring about stones and glasshouses. For example, he describes Friedrich Hayek as succeeding ‘Orwell’s old foe Laski in the chair at the London School of Economics’, but he didn’t: Michael Oakeshott did. He quotes from C.P. Snow’s ‘Two Cultures’ lecture, ascribing it to ‘the mid-1960s’, though it was delivered and published in 1959. Most bizarrely, he even mangles an extremely well-known line of Orwell’s, his tirade about ‘every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-wearer’ and so on. Hitchens notes, rightly, that Orwell included ‘feminist’ in this list along, he goes on to say, ‘with the fruit-juice drinkers, escaped Quakers, sandal-wearers and other cranks’. ‘Quakers’, yes, but ‘escapedQuakers’? Escaped from where, exactly?
Trying to characterise for myself a certain tone that seems to be becoming more and more marked in Hitchens’s recent writings, I recalled that in Martin Amis’s baroquely footnoted Experience, there is a relatively brief note on Amis’s almost filial relation to Saul Bellow, in which, having clarified that although he was not Bellow’s son he was Bellow’s ideal reader, Amis added: ‘I am not my father’s ideal reader, however. Hisideal reader, funnily enough, is Christopher Hitchens.’ One can see why that could seem odd or unexpected, but the more Hitchens I read the less unexpected it becomes. To be the ideal reader of Kingsley Amis, one would need, among much else, to be responsive to the pleasures of being bloody. Hitchens doesn’t actually list ‘giving offence’ among his hobbies in Who’s Who, but perhaps that’s only because it’s not a hobby. It’s interesting, too, that Martin Amis can be the ideal reader for Bellow despite the obvious cultural differences; it is unimaginable that Kingsley Amis’s ideal reader could be anything other than deeply English.
Of course, ‘deeply English’ is the accolade that one group of Orwell’s admirers are keenest to bestow on Saint George, and Hitchens, though properly suspicious of Tory evocations of deep England, does not dissent from this description or its positive force. At one point he concludes a nice little riff on the resemblances between Orwell and Larkin by acknowledging their front-runner status ‘in the undeclared contest for most symbolic Englishman’. What is particularly striking here is the way in which Hitchens, wanting to identify with a kind of Englishness that is at once authentic and radical, free from the taint both of ‘heritage’ kitsch and of a class-bound nostalgia for social hierarchy, aligns himself with a tradition that goes back to Tom Paine, Milton and the Diggers. This move has structural similarities to the Norman Yoke theory of the 17th century, which claimed that the popular liberties of the Saxons had been (temporarily, for several centuries) suppressed by the alien laws of a conquering aristocracy. And this brings out how much Hitchens, cosmopolitan man of letters and geopolitical analyst though he may be, is also a kind of country-party Whig, quick to sniff corruption at court or abuses of power by over-mighty governments. This affinity almost declares itself when he quotes Orwell endorsing Milton’s invocation of ‘the known rules of ancient liberty’. This is an ‘English tradition’ with which he, like Orwell, is proud to identify.
Part of what is attractive and persuasive about Hitchens’s take on Orwell is his insistence on the way some of the latter’s most admirable positions represent a kind of triumph over himself, as he educated himself into more liberal convictions against the grain of his inherited attitudes and temperamental inclinations (here ‘Orwell’s victory’ can be understood in a more personal, less world-historical sense). One can’t help wondering whether there isn’t something of this in Hitchens, too, and whether, as with Orwell, we don’t sometimes get a glimpse of the attitudes which the son of Commander Eric Hitchens RN might have been in some ways expected to hold (i.e. roughly those of his other son, the Mail on Sunday columnist Peter Hitchens). As Christopher Hitchens perceptively, but perhaps also self-revealingly, says of his subject: ‘George Orwell was conservative about many things, but not about politics.’
One of the qualities he claims Orwell managed to ‘suppress’ in himself was his ‘anti-intellectualism’. Yikes! If that’s how he wrote after having ‘suppressed’ his anti-intellectualism . . . Perhaps he means ‘suppress’ in the sense in which he suppresses his own tendencies in this direction, as when he speaks of ‘the intellectual rot . . . spread by pseudo-intellectuals’. In the (mercifully short) chapter called, ominously ‘Deconstructing the Postmodernists’, he finds the source of contemporary ‘intellectual rot’ in ‘Continental’ thinkers and their American disciples. Taking up a comparison between Orwell and Adorno suggested a couple of years ago by James Miller (head of the department at the New School in New York where Hitchens teaches a course), Hitchens reflects that both men might have been surprised that ‘only half a century or so after the Hitler-Stalin Pact, every major city in Europe would be able to claim a free press and a free university,’ and he goes on to speculate that ‘this outcome owes something to both men but more, one suspects, to the Englishman than to the Frankfurt theorist.’ I’m not sure either of them would be quite as confident as Hitchens that the press in some of these cities can so readily be described as ‘free’, but it’s hard not to hear a bit of a nativist growl as he awards the palm to ‘the Englishman’.
At his best Hitchens is a telling writer, but the occasional appearance of this almost blimpish strain means that he is not always at his best in this book. For example, in referring, with extreme briskness, to the vogue in Britain and the US for certain European philosophers, he speaks of Althusser’s doomed project ‘to re-create Communism by abstract thought . . . terminating in his own insanity and by what I once rather heartlessly called his application for the Electric Chair of philosophy at the Ecole Abnormale [sic]’. If heartlessness were the quip’s main failing the self-quotation could almost amount to an apology: in fact by being still so obviously pleased with his schoolboyish mot he condemns himself twice over. But this is just the sort of gag about ‘abroad’ that Kingsley Amis might have liked, the affinity not serving either of them very well in this instance. It’s strange that at the very time when Hitchens is telling audiences in the States that we need to jettison the inherited categories of the 20th century, including those of ‘left’ and ‘right’, if we are to make sense of the radically different world of the 21st century, he should also be sounding more and more like le bloke moyen sensuel of England in the 1950s.
The sight of Hitchens view-hallooing across the fields in pursuit of some particularly dislikable quarry has been among the most exhilarating experiences of literary journalism during the last two decades. He’s courageous, fast, tireless and certainly not squeamish about being in at the kill. But after reading this and some of his other recent writings, I begin to imagine that, encountering him, still glowing and red-faced from the pleasures of the chase, in the tap-room of the local inn afterwards, one might begin to see a resemblance not to Trotsky and other members of the European revolutionary intelligentsia whom he once admired, nor to the sophisticated columnists and political commentators of the East Coast among whom he now practises his trade, but to other red-coated, red-faced riders increasingly comfortable in their prejudices and their Englishness – to Kingsley Amis, pop-eyed, spluttering and splenetic; to Philip Larkin, farcing away at the expense of all bien pensants; to Robert Conquest and a hundred other ‘I told you so’s. They would be good company, up to a point, but their brand of saloon-bar finality is only a quick sharpener away from philistinism, and I would be sorry to think of one of the essayists I have most enjoyed reading in recent decades turning into a no-two-ways-about-it-let’s-face-it bore. I just hope he doesn’t go on one hunt too many and find himself, as twilight gathers and the fields fall silent, lying face down in his own bullshit.

Letters

From Margery Rowe
Reading Stefan Collini’s analysis of Christopher Hitchens’s journalism (LRB, 23 January), I began to ask myself what exactly the ‘bullshit’ is that Hitchens and others are so good at spotting. I grew up supposing that ‘bullshit’ meant the same as ‘humbug’, but that doesn’t appear to be what it means to the dedicatee of Hitchens’s book, Robert Conquest, described by Hitchens as ‘founder of the “universal front against bullshit”’. If the bullshit Conquest was against included, to use one example, Stalinism, it would seem odd to think of Stalinism in terms of humbug. It would be a shame if bullshit were to become a merely dismissive term no different from ‘nonsense’.
Margery Rowe
Falmouth
From John Harding
Stefan Collini’s reference to Christopher Hitchens view-hallooing his quarry like a huntsman reminded me of an incident which took place in the early 1960s at a prep school called Mount House, on the edge of Dartmoor. I was an assistant English master there; two of the pupils were Christopher and Peter Hitchens. One winter’s day, my English class were reciting Masefield’s ‘Reynard the Fox’. Quite suddenly, we heard the sound of a huntsman’s horn, close by: the Dartmoor Hunt were riding through the school drive and the sports fields in pursuit of the inedible. We abandoned the poetry to watch the real thing. I recall Christopher as a Puckish character, questioning, quick-witted, with literary talents beyond his years. His English master, C.P. Witherington, used to read me excerpts from his pupil’s prose with classic English understatement: ‘Not bad, eh!’ Peter like his more buoyant elder brother was exceptionally gifted, but shy, a little lugubrious and something of a loner.
John Harding
Winchester
From Patrick Skelton
I sensed a scrupulous reluctance on Stefan Collini’s part not to confine Christopher Hitchens to the ranks of the New Right just yet (LRB, 23 January), but since 11 September, in a long series of articles for the Daily Mirror and the Evening Standard, Hitchens has established himself as a strident champion of Bush and Blair’s New World Order and a self-appointed Torquemada to the liberal Left. According to Collini, Hitchens ‘aligns himself with a tradition that goes back to Tom Paine, Milton and the Diggers’. But Hitchens’s ‘contrarianism’ has always had more in common with the patrician rebelliousness of Rochester, Byron and Wilde than with 17th-century religious dissenters. That said, it’s difficult to imagine that that contrarian trio would have had much time for Bush and Blair’s mercantile sanctimony.
Patrick Skelton
London SE1
From Nick Cohen
Having yawned in the face of half the members of the English radical tradition, Stefan Collini unwittingly adds James Cameron to his blacklist of native lefty bores. He accuses Christopher Hitchens of slipping from the high standards of ‘the sophisticated columnists and political commentators of the East Coast among whom he now practises his trade’ into a red-faced, bone-headed Englishness. He supports this charge by citing Hitchens ‘perceptively, but perhaps also self-revealingly’, saying of Orwell that he ‘was conservative about many things, but not about politics’. The professor doesn’t seem to know it, but Hitchens was playing with Cameron’s remark that ‘there is much to be said for retaining the past. I suppose I am at heart, in everything but politics, a rooted conservative.’ It is genuinely boring to footnote every reference, and I’m sure Hitchens didn’t expect all of his readers to register the quote. But he might have hoped that the Professor of Intellectual History and English Literature at Cambridge would have mastered radical literature before he dozed off. As it is, reading more at night and going south in the winter are the only escape routes I can see for Collini from the tedium of unsophisticated England.
Nick Cohen
Observer, London EC1
From David Nicol
Stefan Collini (LRB, 23 January) quotes Christopher Hitchens’s dedication to Robert Conquest, ‘premature anti-fascist … and founder of “the united front against bullshit”’. ‘Premature anti-fascist’ was the name given to the Lincoln Brigade veterans of the Spanish Civil War by the US Army in World War Two. Rather than catapulting these tigers into leadership position, it was considered a black mark.
David Nicol
Kansas City, Missouri
From Tim Sanders
It seems that Keith Douglas had the same understanding of ‘bullshit’ as Margery Rowe (Letters, 6 February). ‘I don’t know if you have come across the word Bullshit,’ he wrote in a letter from Palestine in 1943, ‘it is an army word and signifies humbug and unnecessary detail. It symbolises what I think must be got rid of – the mass of irrelevancies, of “attitudes”, “approaches”, propaganda, ivory towers etc, that stands between us and our problems and what we have to do about them.’ I agree that this still seems insufficient to describe Stalinism – but in left-wing circles there could be no greater insult.
Tim Sanders
Leeds
From Chris Purnell
The terms ‘premature anti-Fascist’ and ‘premature anti-Nazi’ appear to have been applied not only to veterans of the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War (Letters, 6 March) but also to others who had opposed Hitler from the early 1930s. In his autobiography John Platts-Mills recalls being ‘excluded from any form of normal war service by the stupidities of Bevin’. ‘An anti-Nazi history,’ he goes on to say, ‘was of no help and to have been prematurely anti-Nazi was a positive hindrance … we were condemned throughout most of the 1930s on the grounds that only Communists were against the Nazis and this hostility carried over into the war years.’
As for veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Platts-Mills recalls that ‘many lefties who had served in Spain were called up or were accepted when they volunteered. Several more got in only after a tussle with the authorities.’
Chris Purnell
Orpington, Kent
From Paul Romney
Some thirty-five years ago, when I was a newcomer to the United States, an American friend adjured me to respect the meaning of ‘bullshit’ as humbug and not to confuse it with the word for nonsense. That word was ‘horseshit’.
Paul Romney
Baltimore, Maryland

Sunday, January 19, 2014



2 June 2011: LRB

What’s not to like?

Stefan Collini

  • Ernest Gellner: An Intellectual Biography by John Hall
    Verso, 400 pp, £29.99, July 2010, ISBN 978 1 84467 602 6
When Ernest Gellner was teaching at the Central European University in Prague in 1995, the last year of his life, he cultivated informal social relations with the graduate students there. One student ‘confessed to unease when Gellner sat down to watch television with him – saying it was as if Max Weber had dropped by.’ It requires only a little familiarity with Weber’s vastly ambitious oeuvre and notoriously austere personality to imagine why that might be an unsettling experience, as well as an unlikely one. Curiously, Perry Anderson had, three or four years earlier, been trying to imagine Weber in front of a television set, as a way of making a comparison between Gellner’s complacent-seeming endorsement of post-1945 mass affluence and Weber’s more agonised reflections on Europe after 1918: ‘It is difficult to imagine Weber, relaxed before a television set, greeting the festivities of the time as a new Belle Epoque.’
It is hardly surprising that these contrasting allusions both choose to make their point by invoking the name of Max Weber. Perhaps no other proper name crops up so frequently in discussions of Gellner’s work. There was, for all their evident – indeed, almost laughably obvious and incongruous – differences, an important intellectual affinity between the two as analysts of ‘modernity’, of the distinctiveness of the West, of the role of the world religions, and as philosophers of social-scientific method. The comparison becomes almost a reflex in John Hall’s outstanding biography: ‘Gellner’s understanding and account of modern cognition were profoundly Weberian’; ‘No modern thinker has stood so close to Weber in insisting that our times must be disenchanted’; Gellner’s account is ‘Weberian both in according ideology some causal role and in offering a narrative in which different sources of social power mutually condition each other’; and so on. In fact, the connection now looks almost foreordained, since Hall tells us that Gellner’s upwardly mobile father had gone to Berlin in the early 1920s ‘to find out more about Max Weber, who had recently died, and whom he came to admire greatly’. Seventy years later, that Prague student’s quip was spot-on: the vignette would not have seemed so telling had he chosen to compare his teacher to Marx or Durkheim or Pareto or Parsons.
A second-order characteristic that Gellner shared with Weber was the way his work and career fell across several conventionally defined disciplines. An obituary tribute to Gellner pointed to this affinity by quoting Weber’s fine remark: ‘I am not a donkey and I don’t have a field.’ Gellner’s first academic appointment was as a moral philosopher; much of his professional life was spent in a department of sociology; his final appointment (in Britain, before the brief Prague epilogue) was as a professor of social anthropology. This mildly transgressive trajectory gave him some satisfaction; it was with mock ruefulness that he noted a possible parallel between his own career and that of R.G. Collingwood, who was ‘praised as a philosopher by historians and as a historian by philosophers’. Several of his students and admirers responded to Gellner’s disregard for academic pigeonholing: ‘It was from Ernest that I learned not to give a damn about disciplinary tribes. He was a franc-tireur of the disciplines, a zestful poacher who cocked a snook at all fences and all gamekeepers.’ Even the briefest description of Gellner’s later professional identity requires the juxtaposition of several ungainly abstractions: he was, for what such labels are worth, a social philosopher and a comparative historical sociologist.
Hall retraces the steps that led up to this ambitious job description with exemplary care and sympathy. His is genuinely an ‘intellectual biography’, since he is not only exceptionally familiar with Gellner’s work (he attended his lectures as a student and went on to become a colleague) but also formidably well read in most of the areas to which his subject contributed, enabling him to provide judicious arbitrations of various intellectual controversies (Gellner was a great igniter of controversies) as well as occasional corrective criticism. But even at the brute biographical level the story he has to tell is unusually interesting, beginning with that intellectually self-improving father.
His parents were assimilated German-speaking Jews, Habsburg subjects before 1919, and thereafter citizens of the new state of Czechoslovakia (where it seemed wise to speak Czech, at least in public). Prague in the interwar years was cosmopolitan even by the standards of Central Europe: alongside Czech schools, it could boast German gymnasia, Russian and French lycées, and an English grammar school. It was to the last that his parents sent the nine-year-old Ernest in 1935, perhaps prudently preparing for a time when they would have to flee mainland Europe. They almost left it too late; they were fortunate to make it to England in April 1939, eventually settling in Highgate. Gellner’s parents were representative of that stratum of educated, middle-class Jews who, profoundly grateful to Britain for providing them with a home, nonetheless continued throughout the war to speak to each other in the language of the now hated enemy.
Ernest finished his schooling at St Alban’s County School for Boys, where he received a report from his history master that seems mischievously prophetic of the response the pupil’s mature work would provoke from its numerous critics: ‘Ideas brilliant. But he needs to work harder on the facts.’ From here, the already intellectually confident boy won a scholarship to Balliol, going up to read PPE in the autumn of 1943. But military service claimed him after one year, and he joined the 1st Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade, serving in northern Europe after D-Day and eventually reaching Prague in May 1945, a couple of weeks after the occupying Russians. He quickly sensed that the prospects for his former homeland were not good, and returned to England, resuming his studies in Oxford in January 1946. He graduated with a First in 1947 (allowed to take a shorter course because of his war service), and then, through the patronage of Balliol’s Scottish master, A.D. Lindsay, was immediately appointed as an assistant lecturer in moral philosophy at Edinburgh. After two years, he moved to the London School of Economics, where he was to stay for the next 35 years.
A photograph of the 26-year-old Gellner, three years into his LSE lectureship, shows a strong, athletic, sexy-looking man, hardened by his passion for mountaineering and skiing as well as by military service. But at some point in his early thirties he began to suffer from osteoporosis, losing more than four inches over a decade, suffering frequent pain and broken bones, leading him to walk with a stick. That photo also suggests, obscurely, a certain mismatch between the intense, challenging young man who confronts the camera with a stare falling somewhere between steely and sultry, and the professional role he was coming to occupy. For, to all intents and purposes, he was an orthodox product of Oxford ‘linguistic philosophy’ in its heyday, publishing articles in philosophical journals on topics such as ‘Knowing How and Validity’. And the imprimatur of the Oxford philosophy establishment clearly mattered to him: three years after he had left the university, having already been proxime accessit for the John Locke Prize, he went to the trouble of sitting for it again, this time successfully.
But his professional identity was not wholly orthodox even at this stage, since at the LSE he had been appointed in the department of sociology, where Morris Ginsberg kept alive the flame of Hobhousian social evolutionism, and where Gellner’s principal duty was to provide lectures on the history of ethics, a subject which, Ginsberg still believed, would illustrate moral progress. However, Gellner then did something which even Hall’s meticulous and thoroughly researched biography cannot quite explain: he stopped publishing philosophy articles and began doing fieldwork among the Berbers of the High Atlas in Morocco, eventually submitting the fruits of his researches for a PhD in anthropology (the basis of his 1969 book, Saints of the Atlas). Love of the mountains had something to do with it, but so did an intellectual restlessness that left him discontented with the merry-go-round of concepts and eager to try to understand the way actual societies functioned.
Whatever the ingredients in his intellectual development in the mid-1950s, they were to result in something no less striking, in its way, than his trips to remote Moroccan villages, as the young Oxford-trained philosopher publicly and spectacularly bit the hand that had fed him. In 1959, he published Words and Things, originally subtitled ‘A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology’. The book sought to demonstrate that the fascination with the nuances of ‘ordinary language’ which characterised this style of philosophy amounted to nothing more than ‘Higher Lexicography’. The Wittgensteinian practice of linguistic analysis as a solvent for the misleading puzzles of all previous philosophy resulted, Gellner contended, in triviality. In claiming to reveal the richness of everyday language use, the ‘Narodniks of North Oxford’ had invented a mode of anti-philosophy that left the world undisturbed, reducing a once radical form of inquiry to a pastime fit for comfortably situated gentlemen. The book bristles with a kind of displaced class resentment: Gellner hated the social assurance of Oxford philosophy, and he particularly hated its cultivation of indirectness and implicitness. The closing words of the book, parodying Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, were: ‘That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak.’
The reception of the book shaped Gellner’s career in two ways. First, Gilbert Ryle, senior Oxford professor and editor of Mind, the leading trade journal, decided the book was unworthy of review. Bertrand Russell – whom Gollancz, ever the enterprising publisher, had persuaded to write a sympathetic preface – sent a letter to the Times denouncing this as a form of professional censorship. The usual squall in a correspondence-column teacup followed (the episode was given wider currency by Ved Mehta, in a New Yorker article, later republished in Fly and the Fly-Bottle), and Gellner’s name was made. At the same time, the book gave offence where offence was due; after its publication, Hall records, Gellner was ‘effectively expelled from Britain’s philosophical community’.
He was, however, by now launched on the distinctive path of his life’s work, becoming (in Hall’s words) ‘the philosopher of industrialism and the sociologist of philosophy’. His abiding concern hereafter was to try to understand the distinctive character of what he – but not, of course, he alone – termed ‘modernity’ (of which more later). The first major fruit of this enterprise was his hugely ambitious 1964 book, Thought and Change, which laid down a theoretical and historical scheme within which much of his later work is contained.
For Gellner, human history fell into two eras, divided by the coming of industrialism. Once the Industrial Revolution had transformed the leading societies of Western Europe – or at least once the benefits of this transformation had become widespread and fully apparent, which did not happen till after 1945 – there could be no going back to the stable societies of scarcity alleged to have existed before (and still existing in other parts of the world). The ‘crucial premiss is simply that men in general will not tolerate a brief life of poverty, disease, precariousness, hard work, tedium and oppression, when they recognise that at least most of these features can be either obviated or greatly mitigated.’ He regarded science as ‘the form of cognition of industrial society’: it differed from all previous forms of natural philosophy in its ability to transform material reality, and it is the conjunction of industrialism and science that marks what he confidently speaks of as ‘the transition’ in human history – ‘the transition from ignorance and superstition to knowledge and control, from poverty and tyranny to wealth and at least the possibility of freedom’. Philosophies which do not take the measure of this change are, as he put it with the overstatement that lay somewhere between deliberate provocation and unnoticed habit, ‘worthless’.
Thought and Change is an extraordinarily confident and assertive book, insisting on a single major change in history without giving much evidence of knowing a lot about the history of anywhere in particular. Some years later, Gellner co-organised at the LSE what was at the time a celebrated seminar on ‘Patterns of History’, inviting anthropologists, archaeologists and ‘specialists on every period of all major world civilisations’. The level of abstraction of that phrase seems to signal the character, and the drawbacks, of Gellner’s intellectual ambitions. Few historians, surely, would think of themselves as ‘specialists on a period of one of the major world civilisations’. When polemicising against Wittgensteinians or, later, Geertzians, Gellner often said that human beings were not merely ‘concept-fodder’ – that is, that there were determinants of action other than language and culture – but perhaps his own intellectual practices tended to treat the more thickly textured work of colleagues in history, literature and so on as just so much ‘theory-fodder’.
It also seems a sign of something awry with Gellner’s cultural antennae, as well as an indicator of an obvious affinity, that he could describe C.P. Snow’s (thin and tendentious) ‘Two Cultures’ lecture as ‘one of the most important philosophical essays to appear since the war’. He not only shared Snow’s enthusiasm for industrialism as the route to improving the human condition, but he endorsed the lecture’s intense antipathy to ‘literary intellectuals’ (or ‘humanists’ in Gellner’s classification) and its cheerleading for science. Not, in Gellner’s case, any actual science (about which he did not seem especially well informed), but a certain philosophical and sociological idea of science – a mode of inquiry, a methodological icon. He had first read Popper’s Open Society and Its Enemies in 1946 and Hall describes it as ‘the book which was to influence him more than any other’. It is noticeable that Gellner did not seem to relativise science in the way that Weber had relativised the pervasive process of ‘rationality’: he treated it, instead, as the ‘decisive’ intellectual advance in human history. As Anderson puts it, ‘the material affluence afforded by scientific reason’ is his theory’s ‘epistemological trump-card’. As this brief summary suggests, much turned on the nebulous and essentially ahistorical category of ‘modernity’ and its necessary twin, ‘traditional society’, categories that risk barring the way to the nuanced understanding of actual historical change in a specific time and place. (My limited sympathy for this enterprise may partly reflect the fact that so much of what is of interest to a literary critic or intellectual historian of recent centuries simply disappears in the undiscriminating capaciousness of the category of ‘modernity’, figuring only as a series of illustrations of the contrast with the ‘pre-modern’.)
Over the next 30 years, Gellner made important contributions to an impressively wide range of topics, notably his studies of Islam, his theories of nationalism and his critiques of those ideas or intellectual fashions which he saw as attempting, illegitimately, to ‘re-enchant’ the world – thinkers who offered ‘more moral warmth and harmony than they can deliver’. He was a powerful critic of those ideas and movements which he, cultivating a form of anthropological detachment and structural-functional explanation, exposed as intellectual fashions, indirectly expressive of certain social needs but fundamentally misleading about the nature of reality. For him, linguistic philosophy, psychoanalysis, ethnomethodology and poststructuralism all fell into this category. But he was also a notably robust commentator on the appeal and weaknesses of large ideologies, such as Marxism and conservatism. He never succumbed, for example, to the seductions of the form of conservatism promoted by his LSE colleague Michael Oakeshott, observing tartly that ‘tradition may be elegance, competence, courage, modesty and realism … it is also bullshit, servility, vested interest, arbitrariness, empty ritual.’ Gellner didn’t do ideological enthusiasm, but he was at the same time scathing about all forms of relativism. ‘The argument of his social philosophy as a whole,’ Hall summarises, ‘is that we do indeed know certain things. Social science is not an abject failure.’
Running through Gellner’s work, and a source of its remarkable fertility, was the constant urge to seek a wider understanding of forms of life than was held by the social agents themselves. This, it might be said, has been the urge informing the very project of the social sciences. For him, the sociological ‘explanation’ of ideas was bedrock. I hold ‘explanation’ in the tweezers of quotation marks here simply to signal how curious this familiar enterprise is, or ought to be. Ideas are argued to be ‘functional’ (more tweezers) for a particular social group, and the identification of that level of correspondence is held to be deeper, more explanatory, than any merely intellectual characterisation of those ideas. Actually, there was some tension or unsteadiness in Gellner’s practice, since he was too interested in ideas to treat them merely as epiphenomenal flotsam in this way, so we get subtle analyses of what are and are not good reasons for thinking one thing rather than another. But he then always reverted to the sociological perspective of trying to explain why some reasons seemed good reasons to a particular group of agents because of certain features of their social organisation and economic practice. In this respect, Gellner was a peculiar kind of fundamentalist: a sociological fundamentalist.
This has been seen by some of his critics as a damaging limitation of his account of nationalism in particular. Nations and Nationalism, published in 1983, was his bestselling book, one which was widely translated and which has generated a small industry of critical comment. The general thrust of his argument can be seen as an application of his wider theory. Nationalism is not a timeless feature of human societies, but something that arose as a consequence of the dislocations of ‘modernity’. In these circumstances, rule by one’s co-culturals comes to seem the only legitimate form of government. Intellectuals and proletarians come together to self-identify as members of a particular historical ethnos, but it is the need of the society for some principle of homogeneity, not the pre-existing cultural traditions, that creates the distinctively modern phenomenon of nationalism. The book is full of arresting insights, drawn, as ever, from wonderfully disparate sources, but Gellner’s taste for emphatic assertion has laid him open to charges of rigid functionalism, as when he writes that nationalism ‘springs, inevitably, from the requirements of a modern economy’. Critics such as Anthony Smith (once Gellner’s student) have argued that this determinedly modernist account underplays the role both of actual historic continuities and of the emotions that make nationalism more than a set of bureaucratic edicts. Or as Anderson puts it: ‘Whereas Weber was so bewitched by the spell of nationalism that he was never able to theorise it, Gellner has theorised nationalism without detecting the spell.’
This connects to a recurring criticism that Hall permits himself, when he says (he puts it in different ways at different points): ‘Gellner’s account of the forces operative in the age of nationalism is essentially apolitical.’ One of the ways in which he can seem rather unWeberian is in his comparative neglect of, even lack of interest in, political agency. He talks up the role of contingency in abstract terms, but the unpredictable swerves of fortune and play of personality that make politics the embodiment of contingency seem to have left him cold. It may be of a piece with this that I came away from this long biography not knowing anything much about Gellner’s own politics in a party sense or the way he voted, if he did; Anderson, ruminating on Gellner’s uncharacteristically alarmist reaction to labour unrest and oil price rises in the 1970s speculated, ‘one imagines a Conservative vote in 1979,’ though he would have seemed a likely Labour supporter before that, especially during the Wilson ‘white heat of technology’ years. As with some others of his generation, an early anti-Communism seems to have mutated into an enthusiasm for ‘liberalisation’ that could appear to neglect or downplay the systemic injustices inherent in market capitalism.
Of the lesser controversies in which Gellner participated, the one that remains greenest in academic folk-memory is his spat with Edward Said in 1993. Gellner published a highly critical review of Culture and Imperialism in the TLS, disputing the role Said ascribed to imperialism in blocking the development of Muslim societies and challenging his enveloping condemnation of ‘Orientalist’ prejudices in two centuries of European scholarship on the Arab world. In his reply, Said largely ignored the main challenge, concentrating on what he regarded as the defects of Gellner’s own scholarship on Islam, pointedly emphasising that it was undertaken without knowledge of Arabic or Berber (this wasn’t true: Gellner had become proficient in Berber in the course of his fieldwork). The exchange went through another couple of rounds, marked by the usual increase in animosity and decline in relevant argument. Robert Irwin, in For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and Their Enemies (2006), concludes that it was ‘one of the finest intellectual dogfights of recent decades’. I’m not so sure. Neither comes out of it all that well, with Gellner becoming increasingly mocking or flippant and Said seeming incapable of acknowledging his own mistakes.
Hall remarks of the exceptionally favourable reception of Conditions of Liberty, published the year before Gellner’s death, that ‘it was recognition … that he had become a public intellectual.’ I wonder. It was certainly recognition that he had become a major figure, one whose work, now much translated and reprinted, stood near the centre of several large issues in the understanding of modern societies. Yet Gellner’s direct participation in public debate, beyond academic circles, was patchy and comparatively slight. He stood aloof from contemporary politics, and did not court media exposure. Reversing Noël Coward’s dictum, he seems to have regarded television as a medium for watching rather than appearing on. And although he wrote prolifically for more than 30 years, a close examination of his complete bibliography reveals rather little writing clearly directed at a non-academic readership. The nearest he came to doing this with any regularity was as a contributor to the TLS. He did occasional pieces for the weeklies, plus a scattering of broadsheet reviews, but his preferred genre was the essay or conference paper which, by the standards of conventional professional practice, may have been informal and cross-disciplinary – full of ideas, wit and provocation, not necessarily overladen with references – but which was clearly directed at other scholars who were willing to engage with the large questions (often theoretical or comparative) that exercised him. He was the reverse of the narrow specialist, and he was a living reproach to parochialism, yet he was not, or not quite, what has come to be understood by the imported American label of ‘public intellectual’. His peers were figures such as, say, the anthropologist Jack Goody or the social theorist W.G. Runciman – theorists of great conceptual and empirical range, but not primarily contemporary political and cultural commentators – rather than media-friendly academics such as Hugh Trevor-Roper or A.J. Ayer.
The very enterprise of comparative historical sociology, magnificent though it is in its tireless attempt to find pattern and explanation across societies and millennia, is bound to take an aerial view, and perhaps that, too, helped distance Gellner from the preoccupations of his local culture. It is also noticeable that although he had fruitful intellectual relations with an exceptionally wide range of scholars in different disciplines, historians figure surprisingly little in this biography, and scholars of art and literature appear scarcely at all. In principle, a compensating level of detail might have been provided by anthropology, by the meticulous ethnography of a particular, often very small, social group, but for Gellner the chief function of such detail was to test hypotheses about social structure, kinship patterns, religious belief and ritual and other very large, meta-sociological categories. Perhaps for this reason, some of his most attractive writing is to be found in the form of occasional essays and reviews, where the potentially Procrustean demands of theory were often less in play.
This intellectual biography makes Gellner seem attractive and admirable in so many ways that I am slightly puzzled not to find myself more wholly in sympathy with the tenor of his work. In person, he appears to have been wry, witty, irreverent, loyal to friends; professionally, he was unmoved by disciplinary tribalism, bored by administration, endlessly supportive to graduate students; in public matters he was unyieldingly secular, sexually tolerant, instinctively liberal; intellectually he was restless, sceptical, constantly driven to enlarge the circle of understanding; he was the enemy of cant, uplift and pretentiousness, the critic of the simplifications of ‘identity’, the champion of the duties of intelligence; and in addition he was a stylish, amusing and productive writer. What’s not to like? Not a lot, actually: there is genuinely much to admire. Yet somewhere in the mix there were elements that make one pause – a streak of, if not exactly philistinism, then aesthetic mulishness; a marked intellectual impatience; a too quickly dismissive attitude towards radical social criticism; and, underlying everything else, that slightly relentless sociological reductivism. Methodologically, Gellner could seem like a curious mixture of Popper and Evans-Pritchard; in substantive historical content, he at times appeared to be an unholy combination of Karl Polanyi and C.P. Snow. The datedness of those names says something about his trajectory as well as about his affinities with a style of brisk Austro-English positivism in social science.
And yet that description is itself too brisk, and in particular underplays his stylishness and fleetness of foot. Anderson speaks of Gellner’s ‘insouciantly reconnoitred forays … travelling light over the most variegated terrain to unexpected theoretical effect’. That manner could, sometimes, be very winning (just as it could, at others, be merely irritating), and the variousness of the terrain is, without question, hugely impressive. But there was something about that imperious ‘theoretical’ intent, something about the way in which empirical detail was subjugated to conceptual forcefulness, that has clearly left other readers besides myself uneasy. I admire, as Hall clearly does, the intellectual honesty with which Gellner confronted his life and his world, but I wonder whether he did not at times succumb to the pathos of austerity, to the note of self-congratulation that can haunt the insistence on being unillusioned. Perhaps an element of existential drama, like the risk of explanatory high-handedness, comes with the territory if one aspires to be a comparative historical sociologist, the analyst of a disenchanted world. The vignette about watching television with his student may suggest an attractive lack of self-importance, but the student’s playful allusion to Weber may also suggest that Gellner did not lack a sense of the elevated company he was trying to keep during working hours.

Letters

From Lawrence Rosen
In his review of John Hall’s Ernest Gellner: An Intellectual Biography Stefan Collini says that Hall is unable to explain why Gellner stopped publishing philosophy and began doing fieldwork in Morocco (LRB, 2 June). But Gellner was pursuing that classic issue of Central European political philosophy: how is anarchy possible? Following E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Robert Montagne, he professed to have found the answer in the segmentary tribal structure of the Berbers of the High Atlas. Though the claimed solution never convinced those of us working with Clifford Geertz, it should also be noted that Gellner never held our views against us and was as generous to those who disagreed with him as to students of his own.
Lawrence Rosen
Princeton
From Maurice Plaskow
Ernest Gellner was two years above me at St Albans County School, an institution distinguished during those war years mainly by an eccentric and largely incompetent staff, two of whom, however, went on to professorships after they escaped. The history teacher referred to, who was also the deputy head, was a lazy sod who would set classes some reading and then disappear to smoke in his small stockroom. I remember often seeing Gellner reading, alone in the library. He didn’t mix much, which was understandable since I doubt there were any boys in his year he would have been interested to talk to. The head was a humourless, prim man, fond of the cane, who refused to allow us to have the New Statesman in the library. It makes Gellner’s achievement in getting a scholarship to Balliol even more impressive.
Maurice Plaskow
Edgware
From David Seddon
As John Hall remarks in his intellectual biography of Ernest Gellner, I was a student of Gellner’s at the LSE in the late 1960s-early 1970s, and came to know him quite well (LRB, 2 June). My PhD thesis in social anthropology was based on fieldwork in north-east Morocco. Lawrence Rosen’s suggestion that Gellner sought out his fieldwork site in the Moroccan High Atlas in order to pursue the issue of ‘how is anarchy possible’ puts the cart before the horse (Letters, 16 June). Long before he developed his ideas about segmentation and tribal politics, Gellner was captivated not only by the mountains but also by ‘the Berber villages of the central Atlas, each building clinging to the next, the style wholly homogeneous, the totality crying out that this was a Gemeinschaft’. He knew at once that he ‘wanted desperately to know, as far as an outsider ever could, what it was like inside’ (his italics). He sought, as a self-avowed ‘urban, cerebral, mobile, rootless and uneasy intellectual’, to enter into a ‘community’. This came first; the notion that the social and political life of these Berber communities was based on a measure of order and trust, which Gellner identified in terms of a combination of segmentation and rule by saints, came later, during the fieldwork itself and as a result, in part, of his reading of Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the Nuer of Sudan and the Sanussi of Cyrenaica.
David Seddon
Brockdish, Norfolk
From Kate Pahl
My father, Ray Pahl, an emeritus professor of sociology at Essex, and a friend of Ernest Gellner’s in the 1960s, told me – this was my last conversation with him: he died at the beginning of this month – that the reason Gellner went to the Atlas Mountains to do his research was not his romantic affinity with mountains, as Collini suggests; instead, it was on the suggestion of his doctoral supervisor, Paul Stirling, whose seminal book, Turkish Village, advocated fieldwork conducted at close quarters with a particular social group.
My father was planning a longer letter to the LRB before he died. In it, he would no doubt have mentioned that he introduced Gellner to George Soros, who funded many intellectuals working in Eastern Europe at the time. Soros subsequently fell out with my father, but not with Gellner. ‘You shafted me not in the back, but in the stomach,’ my father joked to Gellner some time later.
Kate Pahl
University of Sheffield
From Gabriele vom Bruck
Stefan Collini writes that after taking up a professorship at the LSE, Ernest Gellner did something that even John Hall’s biography ‘cannot quite explain: he stopped publishing philosophy articles and began doing fieldwork among the Berbers of the High Atlas in Morocco’ (LRB, 2 June). In an interview conducted with John Davis in 1991, Gellner explains that he foresaw that the establishment of the state of Israel would lead to a tragic confrontation with the Muslim world: ‘The least one could do was try and understand that world.’
Gabriele vom Bruck
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
From Sarah Gellner
It was good to read Stefan Collini’s attempt to get a grip on the difficult and contradictory person that was my father, Ernest Gellner; an attempt I’ve been making and failing at all my life (LRB, 2 June). Funny, Dad’s professional reluctance to occupy a ‘field’, the point that everyone makes about him. Actually, ‘field’ in the academic sense was one of his favourite terms. ‘That’s not your field’; ‘What’s his field?’ As a pony-mad girl, I, like Weber apparently, found this mildly amusing, but my father wasn’t being funny.
I never got on with him. I believed he never liked me, never admired anything I did, made me feel constantly inadequate and disappointing, if not downright embarrassing. Perhaps the problem was due simply to my being a certain type of woman. Whatever else he was, Ernest Gellner was not a feminist. Anyone familiar with his work would agree that the absence of interest in gender in his anthropological and sociological output is striking given that, as Collini says, he wasn’t a man to let his own ignorance on any subject hold him back. I think that, sensing his own instincts here were out of place, he never found anything acceptable to say on the subject. Many of his favourite jokes were frankly unacceptable. ‘Rape, rape, rape, all summer long’ was one. But that didn’t hold him back in private.
So although most of what Collini writes is spot on, as far as I can judge, I think he is wrong to call him a sexual liberal. If there was one thing Dad disliked more than feminists, it was homosexual men. He was not happy to receive a request in the 1980s, asking for him to support the lowering of the gay age of consent to 16. I remember being baffled by his appeal to me on quasi-feminist grounds: that this would make young men vulnerable in just the same way I claimed young women already were. ‘So you think the age of consent for girls should be raised to 21?’ I asked. He just walked away. Perhaps this is all part of the elusive unlikeability Collini is looking for. I think so. My father was frank and honest to a fault about many things, but not about everything, and not always about himself.
Politically, he and I were on opposite sides in the 1980s. He was enamoured of Margaret Thatcher, just when my left-wing fervour was at its peak. He also hated the Guardian. His closest friends then, and later, were conservatives; Ken Minogue, Oliver Letwin’s mother, Shirley. He had long since fallen out with Ralph Miliband, I believe on political grounds. In earlier decades he might have voted Liberal, but never Labour, in the deep Tory countryside where I grew up in the 1960s and 1970s. Labour was nowhere there; all the daring bohemian types voted Liberal. My father loved it there, in the English Tory heartland; they were the happiest days of his life.
Sarah Gellner
London SE11